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1. INTRODUCTION
Contracts designed to transfer risk from the public to the private sector 
with the aim of achieving more cost-efficient procurement of public infras-
tructure and services have become widely used in Europe and beyond. 
Since their inception in the UK in the mid-90s, these contracts have also 
been continuously criticized as too costly because they allegedly allow pri-
vate sector investors and operators to realize substantial profits.
But realizing cost savings compared to traditional procurement and 
allowing private profits do not have to be mutually exclusive propositions.
Importantly, the effect of transferring risk on contracting efficiency using 
the specific contractual instruments embodied for example by the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK has not been studied consistently in 
the literature, which tends to focus on describing the optimal contract. In 
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this paper, we propose to reverse the perspective and provide a theoreti-
cal and empirical assessment of the efficiency of actual contracts used to 
procure public infrastructure using the PFI as an example. Moreover, the 
PFI model has been adopted in most European countries including France, 
where it is known as Contrats de Partenariats, and in North America where 
such contracts are known as P3s.
We use data on construction contracts in UK PFI schools to show that risk 
transfer leads to the self-selection of a few efficient firms at the bidding 
stage and to the likely ex post inefficiency of PFI contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II details our intui-
tion and derives fundamental insights from the economics literature on 
contracts and regulation ; section III describes our dataset of UK school 
construction contracts and provides some background information about 
school procurement under the PFI ; section IV describes and discusses our 
results and section V concludes and discusses policy implications.
2. INTUITION
The intuition behind this paper is that the use of risk transfer to achieve 
cost-efficiency in public procurement, and exemplified by the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK, acts as a revelation mechanisms of 
firm’s type and leads to a separating equilibrium which is characterized 
by ongoing ex post inefficiency. As we argue in the conclusion, high ex post 
inefficiency should be expected to undermine long-term commitment 
and increase the likelihood of renegotiation on the part of the delegating 
authority (political risk).
The rest of this section details our intuition and presents a non-formalised 
analysis of the economics of PFI contracts.
2.1. Setting
Most public procurement is done using cost-plus contracts in which the 
public sector bears the risk of ex post cost overruns (Bajari et al., 2006; 
Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). Such cost overruns are ubiquitous (Flyvbjerg et 
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al., 2003) and have motivated governments to shift towards risk trans-
fer contracts to procure public infrastructure. The UK government, for 
example, highlights cost control as one of the main reasons for the use of 
fixed price contracts1.
However, when it comes to transferring risk, real-world public procure-
ment does not allow for the « second best » suggested in the literature: 
instead of sharing risk along a cost continuum, as theory suggests (Baron 
& Besanko, 1987), the public sector proposes a binary choice between full 
risk transfer through a PFI contract or little or no risk transfer through 
traditional procurement (TP)2.
By full risk transfer, we mean that all cost liabilities inherent to delive-
ring a contractible public service (construction, operation and mainte-
nance costs) are passed on to the firm in exchange for a fixed payment 
made throughout the life of the contract and agreed ex ante, at the time 
of contract signature. Other categories of costs, such as those incurred 
because of regulatory changes or « force majeure » events are typically not 
transferred. With the PFI, the cost of the service provided not being nee-
ded (demand risk) is also borne by the public sector, which remains res-
ponsible for deciding what and how much public service is needed.
While the firm’s cost of capital is typically higher than the public sec-
tor’s, the assumed ability of the former to improve the cost efficiency of 
infrastructure project delivery over a period of several decades provides 
the justification for transferring risk. In other words, the improved cost 
efficiency of private sector infrastructure delivery must more than offset 
its higher cost of capital to make the risk-transfer contract valuable to tax 
payers, or to create « value of money » in British procurement parlance.
To determine whether or not this is the case, the public sector is required 
to define a counter-factual to private sector bids. This counter-factual is a 
risk-adjusted, discounted cash flow comparison between the cost of hiring 
the preferred bidder and that of using traditional procurement methods. 
1 (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ppp_index.htm).
2 One way to interpret this phenomenon is to say that it is too costly to write proper 
incentive contracts (with risk sharing) and that only a more binary form of risk trans-
fer (full vs. none) can be achieved.
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It presupposes that the public sector knows « its own risk » when delive-
ring public infrastructure using traditional methods3.
Once awarded, each contract leads to the creation of a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) or project company, funded with equity capital provided by 
the firm and other investors and raising commercial debt to finance its 
capital programme. The SPV then hires contractors to build and operate 
an infrastructure facility and deliver services according to the output spe-
cification agreed at the bidding stage. In exchange, it receives a recurrent, 
pre-agreed, inflation-linked payment, known as the « unitary charge » for 
the duration of the contract, typically 25 years or longer.
It should be noted that project financing and its significant use of debt 
creates incentives for the SPV to manage the risk it takes under the PFI 
contract effectively. A necessary step towards raising debt finance from 
banks requires the SPV to have passed construction risk to another party 
– usually a branch of the SPV’s sponsors – under a fixed price, date-cer-
tain contract. Thus, some of the major risks transferred from the public 
to the private sector under PFI contracts are managed or hedged comple-
tely by the SPV.
We now analyse these contracts from the point of view of economics; but 
instead of deriving an optimal contract, we aim to assess the ex ante and ex 
post efficiency of observed PFI contracts.
2.2. Ex ante efficiency
Let’s say that there exists two types of private firms that can deliver 
infrastructure projects. The first type is efficient and can reduce costs 
and control risks, the other is not and cannot. The public sector wants to 
delegate the task of building and operating public infrastructure but does 
not know which firms to delegate these tasks to. If the public sector writes 
a contract transferring little or no risk to the firm, as it is the case for 
most traditional public procurement, the efficient firms have an incentive 
3 This « public sector comparator » (PSC) is used to assess long-term risk transfer 
procurement contracts in the UK (UK Treasury, 2011b), Australia (Infrastructure 
Australia, 2008), New Zealand (New Zealand Treasury, 2009) or France, where it is 
called étude préalable (MAPPP, 2011).
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to mimic the inefficient ones at the bidding stage (adverse selection) and 
make no effort to reduce and control costs (moral hazard). In this case, 
whichever firm is hired, the public sector has to cover any future costs 
and evidence shows that significant cost overruns are indeed the norm in 
public works (Flyvbjerg & Holm, 2003). In other words, in the absence of 
an appropriate incentive scheme, private information about firms’ type 
(efficient or not) and actions (risk management or not) leads to high pro-
curement costs for taxpayers.
This situation can be set as a principal-agent problem: a principal (the 
public sector) delegates a task to an agent (the firm), but the agent has pri-
vate information about some aspect θ of the task in question (adverse selec-
tion), and can decide whether or not to exert effort e that can influence 
the realisation of the task (moral hazard). Typically, a contract determines 
a volume of trade or production q by the agent and a remuneration or 
transfer t, which can be a function of a risk-sharing coefficient, say α. The 
fundamental intuition behind the principal-agent framework is that the 
optimal t, α and q under asymmetric information may be distorted from 
their full-information « first best » because of the agent’s strategic use of 
its private information.
The classic optimal response to an agency situation where the agent has 
an incentive to misreport his costs is to offer a compensation scheme that 
minimises ex post inefficiency (second-best). To achieve this, the princi-
pal must devise a « revelation mechanism » i.e. an incentive compatible 
menu of contracts (Laffont & Martimort, 2002) which induces agents to 
reveal their private information (about θ or e or both) in exchange for 
a rent. Thus, to solve the delegation problem identified above, the public 
sector must offer to all firms a menu of contracts by which each firm 
has a choice to bid for the same low-risk traditional procurement contract 
or for a new contract to invest in the delivery of public infrastructure in 
exchange for a fixed payment, as long as the demonstration of cost-savings 
compared with the low-risk option can be made4. 
The point of such contracts is to transfer risks that are endogenous. 
Exogenous risk, like the impact on costs of the weather or ground condi-
tions, are the same whoever is exposed to them and it is always socially 
4 i.e. the public sector comparator (PSC) test is conclusive.
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desirable for the least risk-averse party to bear them i.e. the risk-neutral 
public sector (Arrow & Lind, 1970). But if risks are a function of who bears 
them and risk transfer creates incentives to manage risks, then a risk 
transfer contract can be socially desirable even if the party bearing the 
risks is not the least risk averse and requires a risk premium i.e. a higher 
cost of capital: with endogenous risks, risk transfer can reduce total future 
costs.
However, the endogeneity of risk is also what makes risk transfer ineffi-
cient: how much risk the firm is effectively taking under the fixed price 
contract is private information. It follows that, unless competition for the 
contract is perfect, this private information is a source of rent or risk-free 
profit for the firm i.e. the project internal rate of return set higher than 
its weighted average costs of capital for 25 years.
The necessity for the firm to invest equity in the project company and to 
raise the necessary financing plays an important role in a multi-period 
setting. We know from the literature that investment in relationship-spe-
cific assets is likely to be suboptimal without long-term contracts creating 
binding commitment since each party other expects ex post renegotiation 
and profit expropriation (Hart, 1995). Thus, to induce the firm to make a 
long-term, relationship-specific investment, the public sector must make 
a credible commitment not to expropriate the firm’s rent, which is embo-
died in the 25-year, revenue promise (the unitary charge), which characte-
rises PFI schemes.
Formally, we know that when a cost sharing rule is pre-agreed and creates 
a credible commitment mechanism, the principal/agent game becomes a 
case of « false dynamic » (Laffont & Tirole, 1993), which means that we can 
usefully approach the ex post efficiency of these contracts within a static 
setting.
2.3. Ex post efficiency
The agency literature shows that under the optimal second-best contract 
the principal must trade off allocative efficiency against the costly 
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information rent5 given up to the agent. To keep the information rent 
to a minimum, output q is typically distorted beyond the efficient level. 
However, with PFI contracts, the public sector remains the ultimate gua-
rantor of the continuity and quality of public services, which is set before 
contracting take place. Thus, there is little scope to distort output to reduce 
inefficiency6.
Likewise, the degree of risk sharing between principal and agent is dis-
torted to minimise the effect of moral hazard. Typically, the public sec-
tor prefers to respond to the hidden action problem with a fixed price 
contract and to respond to the private information problem with a cost-
plus contract (Baron & Besanko, 1987). However, under both adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard, the literature always concludes that « incentive 
contracts » (between cost-plus and fixed price) should be preferred to 
pure fixed price or cost-plus contracts (Baron & Myerson, 1982; McAfee & 
McMillan, 1986)7. Using Canadian procurement data, Baron and Besanko 
show that risk transfer tends to increase the average price of the win-
ning bid. These authors estimate the optimal risk sharing coefficient to be 
around 0.6 (Baron & Besanko, 1987).
With PFI contracts, this ratio is set to unity despite the fact that with 
adverse selection and moral hazard, full risk transfer through a fixed 
price contract is never optimal. Instead, greater allocative inefficiency 
5 In the procurement literature, the information rent is « costly » from a welfare 
perspective because of the shadow cost of public funds (the distortion introduced by 
taxation).
6 Contracted output thus has to be sufficiently contractible and ex post observable. For 
standardized units of certain types of public services such as schools facilities or 
standard roads, it is not completely unrealistic to consider that a well-run procu-
rement agency could define a « reasonably » complete output specification. In an 
incomplete contracting world, this is equivalent to the requirement in Hart et al. 
(1997) and Hart (2003) that output specification be easier to specify than input speci-
fications. If output was not contractible, as is the case for very large complex infras-
tructure projects, contract variations (ex post changes to specification of outputs, fee 
schedules etc.) may be ex post equilibrium outcomes (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005) 
and cost-plus contracts dominates fixed price (risk transfer) contracts in efficiency 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
7 The optimal incentive contract is found to be closer to a fixed price contract than a 
cost-plus one. Indeed, cost-plus contracts perform poorly in selecting efficient (low-
cost) firms and also fail to incentivise firms to reduce risk.
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(lower risk sharing) would be required to mitigate the information rent in 
the presence of costly risk aversion (Baron & Besanko, 1987; Salanié, 1990). 
In extreme cases, the pooling of the less efficient types may occur, espe-
cially for high levels of risk aversion, which can make it difficult to obtain 
a separating equilibrium (Bontems & Thomas, 2003; Laffont & Rochet, 
1997). In this last case, no firm would bid for the risk transfer contract.
PFI contracts are thus a case of solving the moral hazard problem (creating maxi-
mum incentives for cost reduction) at the expense of increasing the adverse selection 
problem and therefore the selected firm’s information rent (Laffont & Martimort, 
2002)8. Such contracts can be said to achieve ex ante efficiency (solving the 
task delegation problem under asymmetric information) at the cost of ex 
post inefficiency (the selected firms receives a risk-free rent).
With fixed output and full risk transfer, the public sector can only rely 
on competition for the risk-transfer contract (between efficient firms) to 
minimize the efficient firm’s information rent ex ante.
2.4. Competition and ex post inefficiency
In a classic adverse selection model, the ability of the efficient firm to 
capture a rent can be eliminated by introducing competition for that 
rent until adverse selection becomes irrelevant (Salanié, 2005). However, 
numerous authors are skeptical about the ability of the competitive ten-
dering of public works to deliver the best possible price for the public sec-
tor. Writing about PFI contracts, Grout (Grout, 1997) and Bennett and Iossa 
(Bennett & Iossa, 2006) suggest that suppressing the problem of informa-
tion revelation at the bidding stage may not be without costs.
Closely linked to the question of competition is that of the « distribution of 
types » of agents that may enter into a contractual relationship with the 
principal. Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter7) show that the optimal incen-
tive scheme is not affected by the auctioning of the contract, but that the 
size of the efficient firm’s rent is a function of the distribution of firm 
types.
8 Laffont and Martimort (2002) show that preventing moral hazard hardens the 
adverse selection problem and allocative distortions are then always greater than 
under pure adverse selection.
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How many firms can take substantial risks in public infrastructure pro-
ject? The « shallowness » of the PFI market (Standard & Poor’s, 2005) is 
a point frequently made in the empirical literature: evidence suggests 
that only a few large international firms can bid for such complex and 
long-term projects and usually do so as part of a consortium (House of 
Commons, 2005). Furthermore, and as we described above, PFI contracts 
require construction firms to invest equity in a project company upfront, 
creating high entry and opportunity costs that only larger firms may 
consider.
In the case of awarding PFI contracts, numerous studies have suggested 
that competition is not perfect9. Bids typically cluster « a bit below » the 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) i.e. the estimate of the public sector’s total ex 
post cost, accounting for its own risk of cost overruns10. This is because the 
benefits of the risk transfer contract are estimated as a function of how 
much risk the public sector is insured against under a PFI contract, not 
how much risk the firm bears. With imperfect competition, it should not 
be a surprise that bids should simply reflect the willingness to pay for risk 
transfer of the public sector rather than the required risk premium of the 
firm.
2.5. Contracting solution & separation
Thus, allowing for heterogeneous firm types, the outcome of tendering 
PFI contracts is likely to be a function of the ability of firms to minimise their 
cost of risk bearing as much as their ability to minimise production costs and 
control risks. Using long-term risk transfer contracts to purchase public 
infrastructure for a fixed price over a 25-year period then leads to a separa-
ting equilibrium in which only the largest firms (the most efficient but also 
with the lowest costs of risk bearing) self-select to bid for the risk trans-
fer contracts.
9 A number of studies confirm that competition in the UK PFI sector has been limited 
(NAO 2007) and that collusion in the UK construction sector is widespread (OFT 
2008, 2009).
10 Examples abound : Carlisle PFI Hospital Scheme, PFI : GBP173.1m, PSC: GBP174.3m ; 
Main MOD Building, PFI : GBP746.1m, PSC : GBP746.2m ; Haringey Schools, PFI : 
GBP97.5m, PSC : GBP99m.
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Thus, it should be emphasised that when private information exists, 
paying an information rent to the efficient firm through the risk transfer 
contract is the solution to the task delegation problem initially identified 
i.e. the social cost of the firm’s rent is lower than the extra cost of procu-
rement without risk transfer when no effort was made to minimise costs 
and control risks.
The complete solution to the task delegation problem found in public 
infrastructure procurement with asymmetrical information and limited 
competition is for the public sector to commit not to expropriate the rent of the 
efficient firm by entering into a long-term contract. This can include some 
form of inflation indexation as well, as is the case with PFI in the UK.
Such ex post inefficiency – positive profit rates locked in for 25 years – while 
it allows the investment to happen in the first place, can also explain why 
PFI contracts are frequently perceived as expensive a few years after that 
have been entered into (BBC4 2011).
In conclusion, ex post inefficiency in PFI contracts springs from the diffi-
culty to solve the adverse selection problem under full risk transfer sche-
mes in a context where only a limited number of efficient firms exists and 
competition is thus reduced by risk transfer. The distribution of firm types 
may be heavily dependent on the industrial structure of the construction 
sector in a given country. In countries where firm types are very une-
venly distributed (skewed), with numerous inefficient firms and only a 
few efficient ones, full risk transfer leads to the pooling of most firms in 
the « inefficient » category and the effect of type separation via risk trans-
fer is to reduce competition and to increase ex post inefficiency i.e. the size 
of the efficient firm’s rent.
Thus, an agency setting helps predict the result of full risk transfer in 
public-private contracts as a mechanism to improve the cost-efficiency of 
procurement. This, arguable extreme case is nevertheless well exemplified 
by the PFI in the UK and a number of similar procurement programmes 
currently being implemented in Europe, North America and Australia.
Next, we explore this insight using data from the UK primary and secon-
dary school construction sector.
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3. PFI SCHOOL DATASET
To validate our intuition, we look at primary and secondary school 
construction in the UK. Contrary to other types of infrastructure pro-
jects, schools constitute more homogenous goods, which should facilitate 
direct comparisons between PFI and TP. First, there is a clear requirement 
that all schools in Britain be delivered to consistent, nationally defined 
standards both for regulatory reasons (health & safety) and to satisfy an 
imperative of social equity. Furthermore, school buildings are, ceteris pari-
bus, more standard types of infrastructure projects than hospital, prisons 
or certain government buildings, which may demand more case-specific 
designs11.
3.1. The UK PFI School Programme
The Private Finance Initiative was introduced in the UK in 1992. In the 
first years of the policy, PFI was concentrated in the defence, transport 
and health sectors and there was very little PFI in schools or other sec-
tors that are primarily the responsibility of local governments. However, 
schools in the UK require substantial capital funding to redress several 
decades of under-investment in buildings and facilities and in the late 
1990s the central Government signaled a strong commitment to improving 
educational infrastructure through PFI.
Initially, local authorities had weak incentives to engage in PFI: funding 
for capital investment was allocated by central Government according to a 
distribution formula unrelated to financing method and no requirement 
was imposed on local authorities to consider PFI. Funding rules were sub-
sequently changed to treat grants from central Government for PFI pro-
jects, known as « PFI credits », separately from other funding streams 
and to remove these charges from revenue capping limits (McCabe et al., 
2001)12.
11 e.g. high security prisons vs. juvenile delinquent centres, or the Barts hospital in 
central London which is also a historic building, or the MI5 headquarter, which is a 
highly secure building.
12 PFI credits were cancelled by the new conservative government in 2009.
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Figure 1. Average and total unitary charge committed to be paid to 
135 PFI school SPVs between 1997 and 2038 by the UK Department of 
Education as of September 2009
Source : UK Treasury, own calculations
These changes led to a surge of interest on the part of local authorities. By 
2005/6, PFI commitments in England and Wales amounted to over £2.4bn 
in more than 500 schools through 86 PFI schemes (Audit Commission 
2003). By 2010, total PFI commitments to the school sector alone exceeded 
£23bn as illustrated by figure 1, which summarises the public outlays of 
135 PFI contracts until 2038. This is a perfect illustration of the long-term 
commitment shown by the British public sector in order to induce firms 
to invest in the delivery of primary and secondary schools across the UK.
3.2. Known issues with measuring risk in the PSC
The PFI process requires the contracting authority to estimate a public sec-
tor comparator or PSC, the cost of a similar scheme under traditional pro-
curement including construction, operating and maintenance costs and 
the value of risks transferred over the life of the contract and to proceed 
with the PFI only if the net present value of the stream of unitary pay-
ments is less than the PSC. As we discuss above, in our theoretical fra-
mework this is equivalent to estimating the outcome of contracting with 
the « inefficient » firm or the traditional procurement route.
Demonstrating « value for money » in this way is one of the keys for local 
governments to secure central Government subsidies in the form of PFI 
credits so local governments have an incentive to make PFI work. As we 
also discuss above, the endogeneity of risks transferred in PFI contracts 
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creates a situation of private information about the firm’s risks under the 
contract which may then be very different than that faced by the public 
sector under traditional procurement. However, the « inefficient » firm or 
PSC is the only benchmark against which the PFI bids are evaluated.
Nor have local authorities any incentives to use a different benchmark. 
The UK Audit Commission’s 2003 report on PFI in schools states, « Without 
PFI, the opportunity to obtain new buildings or refurbishment would 
have been lost » (Audit Commission, 2003). The lack of a genuine finan-
cing alternative gives local authorities strong incentives to make sure PFI 
schemes do pass the VFM, which was confirmed in the interviews conduc-
ted by the Audit Commission with Local Education Authorities (LEAs), tea-
chers and other PFI stakeholders: « Some interviewees claimed that the 
incentive to estimate on the high side for the PSC in order to obtain the 
Government funding was strong ». The authors find that in all but two 
of the PFI schemes studied, the cost advantage of the PSC depended on 
the estimate of the « cost of risk » of TP. They also show that the cost of 
risk estimate was higher in projects for which the estimated PSC before 
risk adjustment was lower than the estimated PFI cost (Davies & Ghani, 
2006)13.
In addition to the incentive issues, LEAs may also find it difficult to 
construct reliable PSCs because they lack information on costs. As there 
had been no major investment in school buildings from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-90s and because of the difference in the level of service being 
required under the PFI schemes, LEAs are obliged to construct a hypothe-
tical traditionally procured project as a point of comparison. This problem 
is being overcome gradually as more PFI and non-PFI schools come into 
operation and cost databases are developed.
3.3. School buildings construction contract dataset
Our sample consists of 791 individual building construction contracts 
with a value of more than one million pounds (GBP) for new primary and 
13 Information on the amount of risk transferred was collected for 18 local authorities 
in a 2006 survey by the Department for Trade & Industry. The median « cost of risk 
transfer » was equal to 16% of the unitary payment, with a range of 10-18%.
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secondary school buildings between 2007 and 2010, 508 of which are tra-
ditionally procured schools and 283 of which are part of PFI schools. The 
data is collected from the Glenigan construction contract database14.
Table 1 describes the distribution of the data by total contract price. As 
already reported in the empirical literature on PPPs (Blanc-Brude et al., 
2007), PPP project includes larger projects than traditional procurement. 
For example, excluding very large PFI school buildings (above GBP50m), 
PFI school construction contracts are still larger on average than traditio-
nal procurement, even though the second samples have more similar stan-
dard error, standard deviation, kurtosis and skew (see Figure 2).
Tableau 1. Descriptive statistics
Full sample up to GBP50m sample
Contract Price TP PFI TP PFI
GBPm
Mean 10.24 40.06 9.37 15.44
Standard Error 0.66 3.78 0.42 0.53
Median 5.50 16.00 5.50 15.00
Mode 5.00 16.00 5.00 16.00
Standard 
Deviation
14.95 63.60 9.37 8.17
Sample Variance 223.38 4,044.82 87.85 66.68
Kurtosis 113.26 9.98 2.63 2.31
Skewness 8.29 3.01 1.73 1.09
Range 239.00 399.00 49.00 49.00
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 240.00 400.00 50.00 50.00
14 (www.glenigan.com).
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Figure 2. Distribution of PFI and TP contract prices 
(between GBP1m-50m)
For each contract, we collect the name of the leading firm in charge of 
delivering the building’s construction (main contractor or design and 
build contractor or prime contractor). As well as the information descri-
bed in annex about each contract’s characteristics including total price, 
square meterage, number of storey, number of units contract start and 
end date, duration, etc.
The nature of the price information collected in this database has to be 
clarified: the Glenigan database (EMAP 2010) collects subcontractor-level 
data i.e. the ex ante contract price agreed with the construction firms that 
will deliver individual school buildings. We know that in the case of TP, 
these prices are likely to lead to ex post variations (NAO 2007) whereas PFI 
construction prices are fixed ex ante as discussed above to insulate the SPV 
from construction risk.
4. FINDINGS & INTERPRETATION
To test the hypothesis of firm self-selection and type separation:
— We examine the list of firms that achieve the highest market shares 
in both the PFI and the traditional procurement segments of the school 
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construction sector and casually observe if top firms in one segment are 
different than top firms in the other;
— We run a Pearson independence test (Chi-Square) to determine whe-
ther the observed and expected distributions of the number of projects 
between firms are similar for 142 firms.
To test the hypothesis of a skewed distribution of types and that of 
increased concentration in the PFI segment:
— We casually compare the distribution of firms in the UK construction 
sector by number of employees and sales volume with that of the firms 
engaged in PFI projects ;
— We calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman and C5 indices for the PFI and 
TP segments.
Finally, we run a regression of unit costs for the subset of the data for 
which we can derive per-square-meter unit costs and the relevant expla-
natory variables.
4.1. Firm self-selection
We compare leading firms in the PFI and TP segments of the primary 
and secondary school construction sectors. We find strong evidence of seg-
mentation: as shown in Table 2, the leading ten firms by market share in 
the PFI segment are very different from the leading ten firms in the TP 
segment.
This confirms that when they focus on risk transfer contracts like PFI 
Schools, construction firms leave the TP segment of the market to other 
firms, supporting our hypothesis of the separation of firm types when 
risk transfer contracts are used.
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Tableau 2. Type separation in the primary and secondary schools 
building sector
















Carillion 1 24% 79 32 6 4% 13 15
Laing 
O’Rourke
2 14% 26 55 28 1% 4 13
Balfour 
Beatty
3 13% 37 35 5 4% 11 17
Kier 4 7% 14 51 1 11% 54 11
Morgan 
Ashurst
5 7% 11 64 4 6% 33 9
Interserve 6 6% 18 37 12 2% 13 7
Bovis Lend 
Lease
7 6% 14 42 3 6% 5 60
Bouygues 8 4% 12 32 20 1% 3 24
Miller 9 3% 6 56 11 2% 9 10
Bowmer & 
Kirkland
10 3% 6 56 18 1% 5 15
Willmott 
Dixon
n.a. n.a. 2 11% 53 11
Next, we run a Pearson independence test (Chi-square) of the null 
hypothesis that the probability of any given firms in the sample to deli-
ver a school building under a TP contract is independent of its probabi-
lity to deliver a school building under a PFI contract. We reject the null 
at the 1 % confidence level (DF=141). In other words, in the UK, the dis-
tribution of construction firms between PFI and TP contracts is not ran-
dom. Separation is drive partly by contract size and partly by risk transfer 
but these two dimensions are also highly co-dependent: only the efficient 
firm capable of controlling costs can take large risks.
4.2. Type distribution & concentration
The skewed type distribution hypothesis implies the existence of numerous inef-
ficient firms and few efficient ones. Furthermore, because the ability to 
RISK TRANSFER, SELF-SELECTION AND EX POST EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 141  ➻  1ER TR IMESTRE 2013166
take and manage risk efficiently is also a function of firm size, we should 
observe more numerous small firms and a few larger firms. Finally, if 
fewer firms are able to self-select and choose the risk transfer contract 
(PFI), we should observe higher concentration in the PFI segment.
To explore this hypothesis, we compare the type of firms that have been 
involved in PFI contracts in our sample to the average type of construc-
tion firm in the UK construction sector by number of employees and by 
cumulative sales, as shown on Figures 3 and 4. We collect the number of 
employees and reported sales for firms identified as PFI contractors in our 
dataset from public sources, including websites and annual reports and 
compare it with UK construction sector survey data publihsed by the UK 
Office of National Statistics (ONS). Casual observation suggests that firms 
involved in PFI projects tend to be bigger than the average UK firm in the 
construction sector (non-residential and civil engineering), lending credit 
to the hypothesis that separation of firm types induced by risk transfer in 
PFI contracts reveals a skewed distribution of types.
Figure 3. Distribution of UK construction firms (non-residential 
and structural engineering) and PFI construction firms by number 
of employees
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Figure 4. Distribution of UK non-residential and structural engineering 
construction firms and of PFI construction firms by cumulative sales (£m)
A look at concentration measures further support our hypothesis. 
Generally speaking, British construction is not a sector dominated by a 
few large firms, although very serious concerns have been raised about 
the anti-competitive behaviour of UK construction firms (OFT 2008; OFT 
2009). McCouglan (2004) shows that the largest 100 private UK contrac-
tors (C100 ratio) together account for about 20 % of all economic activity 
in their sector, in comparison with a C100 ratio of 30-35% for UK manufac-
turing. In the same paper, it is shown empirically that since the mid-90s 
the number of entrants to the civil engineering profession has grown rapi-
dly, coinciding with developments in construction technology and grea-
ter emphasis on public safety associated with buildings, as well as quality 
issues and employment practices. However, concentration varies across 
specialist trades and where entry is less easy and capital investment is 
more necessary, concentration is correspondingly higher: constructional 
engineers is a case in point with a 35 % concentration ratio. Furthermore, 
effective competition varies over time with the level of spare capacity in 
the sector (McCouglan, 2004).
Next, Tables 3 and 4 show the concentration measures derived from our 
sample. All measures indicate a significantly higher level of concentration 
in the PFI segment of the primary and secondary school construction sec-
tors than in the TP one.
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Tableau 3. Concentration measures for primary and secondary schools 
building contracts
HHI C5 C10 Active Firms Contracts
TP 0.041 37% 52% 130 508
PFI 0.117 65% 87% 28 283
Moreover, over time concentration has been increasing in the PFI construc-
tion segment as shown in Table 4, while concentration levels has mea-
sured by the HHI index have been relatively stable in the TP segment. 
This should be seen in the context of the falling number of bidders for 
PFI contracts: Davies and Ghani (2006) find that the number of pre-quali-
fied bidders for PFI tenders falls over time. Similarly, the number of bid-
ders responding to invitations to negotiate has fallen, with most projects 
receiving interest from 3-4 bidders in 2001/2 compared to earlier projects, 
which tended to receive interest from 6-8 parties. This may reflect the 
tendency of the sector towards larger consortia involving multiple par-
tners or, as the authors suggest, waning interest in PFI schools after the 
first round of projects and tighter capacity in the construction sector.
Tableau 4. HHI over time for primary and secondary schools building 
contracts







Thus, there is evidence of self-selection and separation induced by the 
PFI/TP menu of contracts, as well as evidence that PFI risk transfer leads 
to increased concentration.
Returning to the theoretical argument above, we know that reduced com-
petition for the risk transfer contract should lead to the survival of the 
agent’s information rent to competitive tendering. In the presence of a 
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skewed distribution of types, PFI risk transfer is thus likely to be ex post 
inefficient, since the mechanism that creates the opportunity for rent see-
king (endogenous risk transfer) is also the one that reduces competition 
for the rent.
4.3. Unit costs regression
Finally, using a sub-sample of our dataset for which we can calculate unit 
costs, we regress construction unit costs expressed in £/m2 using a num-
ber of control variables and a PFI dummy variable to measure the impact 
of risk transfer on construction costs. Our subsample consists of 416 obser-
vation, 340are TP schools and 76 PFI ones. We exclude very small (all TP) 
and very large (all PFI) values from the sample out of concern for their 
representativeness or when a contract includes ad hoc structures, the costs 
of which is not well captured by a per-square-meter measure e.g. a new 
chapel or a sports hall.
Our results are reported in Table 5. We also report coefficient correlations 
in Annex 2. We find that for a range of standard school buildings, ex ante 
construction prices in PFI contracts tend to be lower than in TP contracts. 
Figure 5 plots the logged values of unit costs against contract size (also log-
ged). Unit construction costs in PFI schools follow a form of « efficiency 
frontier » while a significant proportion of the TP contracts has ex ante 
higher unit costs for a given contract size.
Our results suggest that PFI schools have lower construction costs on ave-
rage than TP schools. Furthermore, we know that ex ante PFI construction 
prices are fixed and thus less likely to change ex post than TP construction 
prices, which tend to lead to ex post variations. Thus, ex post construction 
costs for PFI schools should be even lower on average.
This finding is consistent with the notion that the PFI vs. TP menu of 
contracts leads to the efficient firm self-selecting to enter into the risk-
transfer contract and, because under the PFI contract it is the residual 
claimant of its cost savings, exerting maximum effort to minimize and 
control costs.
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Tableau 5. Ordinary Least Square Regression of ex ante construction unit 
prices in UK primary and secondary schools (£/m2)
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 10 25.5919 2.5592 11.7508 0.00000








Intercept 7.2136 0.1836 39.2921 0.0000 6.8527 7.5746
Contract 
Value (log)
0.2967 0.0362 8.1884 0.0000 0.2255 0.3680
PFI -0.1686 0.0704 -2.3946 0.0171 -0.3070 -0.0302
Y2008 0.0610 0.0687 0.8868 0.3757 -0.0742 0.1961
Y2009 0.1557 0.0683 2.2776 0.0233 0.0213 0.2900
Y2010 0.2445 0.0717 3.4100 0.0007 0.1036 0.3855
Extension 
dummy
0.2082 0.1688 1.2334 0.2181 -0.1236 0.5400
Demolition 
dummy
-0.0464 0.0528 -0.8791 0.3799 -0.1501 0.0573
Duration 
(log)
-0.0693 0.0767 -0.9044 0.3663 -0.2200 0.0814
2 to 3 
Storeys
-0.1088 0.0590 -1.8435 0.0660 -0.2248 0.0072
4 to 6 
Storeys
-0.3739 0.1109 -3.3722 0.0008 -0.5919 -0.1560
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Figure 5. Scatter plot of ex ante construction unit prices and contract size
This last intuition fits well with the notion that the efficient firm must 
receive a risk-free rent to accept to self-select, take maximum risk and 
exert optimal efforts: in the case of PFI schools in the UK, the selected 
firms maximize their profit by delivering comparable infrastructure at a 
cheaper cost. This supports our hypothesis of self-selection of the efficient 
firms under the risk transfer contract. Moreover, if, as anecdotal evidence 
suggests (see footnote10), the unitary charge for PFI schools is very similar 
from the public sector comparator because of limited competition, it may 
be the case that the difference between the efficient firms’ cost under the 
risk transfer contract and their revenue is substantial. In other words, as 
we also hypothesized, the efficient firms benefit from a significant ex post 
rent. However, in the absence of comparable estimates of the cost of opera-
tions in both PFI and TP schools, the actual profitability of PFI contracts 
cannot be derived explicitly.
However, the interpretation of the regression result may not seem straight-
forward in the light of previous research, which highlighted higher ex ante 
unit costs in public-private partnerships (PPP) road projects (Blanc-Brude 
et al., 2009).
The difference of sign between reported ex ante construction prices 
should not however be a surprise. The UK PFI sector and the European 
road construction sector represent two distinctive groups of firms with 
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different approaches to profit maximization under long-term risk trans-
fer contracts:
• Under the PFI, with a very predictable and secure stream, the efficient 
firms choose to exert efforts to reduce their costs and control risk (because 
they can) as the most effective profit maximization strategy.
• In road concession contracts, with risky revenues based on real or sha-
dow toll collection, developers and their construction subsidiaries have an 
interest in recouping their investment earlier if they can, and to increase 
their cash flow early in the life of the concession by padding construction 
costs.
In both PFI contracts and European toll roads, we should expect the effi-
cient firms to self-select and, if the distribution of firms is very skewed, 
for a few efficient firms to capture an ex post rent. However, the rent 
extraction strategy differs between sectors: school developers benefit from 
their low cost of construction but secure high prices, while highway deve-
lopers tend to increase construction prices to recoup risk cash flows early.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a theoretical and an empirical analysis of 
the ex ante and ex post efficiency of long-term risk transfer contracts used 
to procure public infrastructure projects for a fixed price as illustrated by 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK.
Using existing insights from agency and contract theory, we detailed the 
intuition that full risk transfer contracts like PFI contracts are likely to be 
ex post inefficient. We concluded that with no other instrument to mini-
mize ex post inefficiency than the degree of competition for the contract, 
the size of the firm’s agency rent was likely to be determined by the distri-
bution of firm types i.e. the more skewed in favour of efficient types the 
distribution is, the less competition there is amongst efficient firms and 
the more likely is the rent of the firm to survive competitive tendering.
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For the policy-maker, it follows that the choice to use risk transfer as a 
revelation mechanism, inducing the self-selection of the efficient firm in 
order to improve ex ante efficiency, should be made in the context of the 
distribution of firm types, which is country- or region-dependent.
Looking at the UK, in the case of primary and secondary school construc-
tion contracts, we find that the probability that firm builds a school 
under a PFI contract is not independent of the probability that it builds 
a school under a TP contract. On the contrary, they are inversely related: 
if proxying firm types by their size (employees, sales) the distribution of 
construction firms involved in building schools under PFI contracts is dif-
ferent than that of all firms in the sector.
We also find much higher concentration within the PFI segment of the 
school construction sector, further suggesting that the distribution of 
types is skewed and advantages efficient firms since they face less compe-
tition for risk transfer contracts than for traditional ones.
Finally, we find that ex ante school construction unit costs for the firm 
are lower on average in PFI schools which is congruent with the notion 
that the efficient firms self-select to bid for the risk transfer contract, fol-
lowing what they exert maximum effort and do indeed minimize their 
cost. Moreover, since the Public Sector Comparator often suggests that the 
total ex post cost of PFI contracts may be similar to TP contracts, we can 
formulate the hypothesis that efficient firms, since they have lower costs, 
have on average higher profit margins i.e. as theory suggests, the efficient 
firm receives a risk-free rent.
5.1. Policy implications
Beyond the obvious need to minimize the social cost of risk transfer in PFI 
contracts, ex post inefficiency when it takes the form of large rents should 
be a concern insofar as it increase the likelihood of political interference 
and renegotiation, greater uncertainty and a return of opportunism in 
the agency relationship.
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In an era in which governments wish to see pension funds invest in public 
infrastructure, the uncertainty created by political risk is all the more 
damaging.
At the beginning of a period of private sector involvement in public 
infrastructure delivery, the public sector is willing to see the efficient 
firm receive a rent because it values the effective delivery of infrastruc-
ture assets and services to the economy. For example, when the PFI was 
launched in 1992, the British infrastructure sector had been starved of 
capital expenditure for more than a decade. When Labour was elected in 
1997 on a promise to deliver public services, the PFI provided the perfect 
vehicle to attract cost-efficient firms and capital to the sector.
Later, once investments have been made and the attractive risk-adjusted 
returns become more apparent (and politically difficult to justify), the 
pressure to renegotiate the rules regulating initial contracts increases. 
Returning to the PFI, ever since their inception or almost, PFI contracts 
have regularly been criticized in the UK. The main concern being that 
investors may be receiving high returns, at the expense of taxpayers.
An important dimension of the contracts used to deliver infrastructure 
in the UK, France and beyond, is that they do not set the private sec-
tor’s rent, as opposed to for example, the economic regulation of utilities 
under the regulatory asset base model, which regularly benchmarks the 
cost of the efficient firm. As a consequence, if competition was so limited 
that adverse selection led to granting a large risk-free rent to the firm, or 
a new technology is introduced that delivers high costs savings, or if the 
firm is simply very good at generating costs savings or manipulating the 
SPVs financial structure to maximize its rent, the temptation or the pres-
sure for the public sector to renegotiate or at least cap profits becomes too 
great to resist.
Thus, even if a principal has to commit to letting the firm earn a risk-free 
rent under the risk-transfer contract, a new principal may not have to 
live by the commitment of its predecessor, especially if an external shock 
(e.g. an economic or financial crisis) provides good reasons to renege and 
renegotiate.
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Thus, as long as Labour was in power, its commitment to the PFI remai-
ned. Elsewhere in the UK, local government that did not feel bound by 
the decisions of Labour challenged the validity of the rents embedded in 
PFI contracts continuously. On a number of instances, the governments 
of Scotland or Wales cancelled planned projects, terminated existing 
contracts (Roy, 2011) and even sold assets that were still claimed by banks 
as security (Ashurst, 2007).
When a new coalition government was elected in the UK in the middle 
of a financial crisis, which was immediately followed by a crisis of public 
finances, the commitment of the public sector to the PFI was unlikely 
to last. At the same time, the main difficulty encountered with conti-
nuing entering into PFI contracts was the accessibility of new debt finan-
cing, especially long-term bank debt15. The increase of PFI borrowing costs 
induced by the reversal of the credit cycle has led to an increase by 6 to 7 % 
of the unitary charge paid by the public sector over the lifetime of projects 
financed since 2009 (NAO, 2010). The realisation that such costs increases 
may be locked-in for 25 years led HMT to announce a new rule on refinan-
cing gains according to which up to 70 % of the gains achieved from refi-
nancing PFI debt raised after 2008 would have to be returned to the tax 
payer (UK Treasury, 2008).
The new UK Government embarked on the search for a « new model » for 
the PFI almost immediately after coming to power. While the PFI had 
designed to reduce the cost of traditional public procurement, in particu-
lar endemic cost overruns and delays in its December 2011 Call for Evidence, 
the UK Treasury chose to characterise the past twenty years of PFI procu-
rement as potentially « too costly, inflexible and opaque » (UK Treasury, 
2011a).
15 PFI debt spreads followed the credit cycle and, having reached a through in 2008 
at around Libor+80-90bps before fees for a 22.5-year term loan, they increased 
to Libor+300-350bps in 2009 for a seven-year mini-perm and have only slightly 
decreased since then. « Mini-perm » debt with tenors of 5 to 7 years (« hard » mini-
perms) introducing significant refinancing risk for projects closed after 2009 has 
become the norm. « Soft » mini-perms allowing for longer tenors but with a margin 
ratchet or cash sweep encouraging a refinancing are also used and introduce new 
risks for equity investors in PFI SPVs.
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Clearly, the initial commitment of the UK public sector to the long-term 
contracts entered into to its social infrastructure has eroded and the net 
benefits are now considered to be insufficient. This shift from commitment 
to resentment is not specific to the UK or PFI contracts. Numerous invest-
ments in policy-derived long-term contracts for infrastructure delivery go 
through the same pattern of events or policy cycle as previous research 
has shown: « Private initiatives work for a while but after a shock to the 
sector takes place the public sector returns as regulator, owner or finan-
cier; after a while the public sector runs into problems and eventually 
finds a hybrid solution to ensure the survival of the sector » (Estache & 
Serebrisky, 2004).
Today, the explicit recognition of the agency dimension of the risk transfer 
mechanisms described above and of their ex post inefficiency would also 
highlight the need to make the efficient firm’s rent transparent through 
cost benchmarking and the regular rebasing of PFI unitary charges as it is 
already done in the water sector for example. Transparency about returns 
and costs would help achieve continued investment and cost-efficient deli-
very of public infrastructure projects while allowing genuine long-term 
commitment for both sides of these contracts.
In a world in which pension funds are increasingly considering inves-
ting for the long term in alternative assets like infrastructure, securing 
the long term commitment of the public sector thanks to a well unders-
tand and universally accepted regulatory regime can only serve both 
public policy objectives and private sector interests. With transparency 
about returns, the incentives of the firm can be preserved while insula-
ting investors from political risk.
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ANNEX – DATA COLLECTED
Variable Description
Generic firm Name Lead firm/Main contractor/D&B Contractor










Number of Units Number
Development Type Text
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